Abstract-Has the Kyoto Protocol induced carbon leakage? We conduct the first empirical ex post evaluation of the protocol. We derive a theoretical gravity equation for the carbon dioxide content of trade, which accounts for intermediate inputs, both domestic and imported. The structure of our new panel database of the carbon content of sectoral bilateral trade flows allows controlling for the endogenous selection of countries into the Kyoto Protocol. Binding commitments under Kyoto have increased committed countries' embodied carbon imports from noncommitted countries by around 8% and the emission intensity of their imports by about 3%. Hence, Kyoto has indeed led to leakage.
I. Introduction
G LOBAL warming caused by anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions is a major public concern around the world. Because countries' greenhouse gas emissions have global effects, decentralized national regulation is inefficient. The Kyoto Protocol, the only international agreement that sets binding emission targets for the majority of industrialized countries and the European Union (EU), has met major criticism from its beginning. Its principle of common but differentiated responsibilities excepts emerging and developing countries en bloc and sets widely different targets even for committed nations. 1 Countries like China and India face no binding constraints. The United States did not ratify the Protocol because it did not include the "meaningful" participation of all developing as well as industrialized countries, arguing that ratification would unfairly put the United States at a competitive disadvantage.
Economists have long pointed to the possibility of carbon leakage: regulation in some countries could change relative goods prices and hence shift production of CO 2 -intensive goods to places that are exempt from such regulation (see, Copeland & Taylor, 2005) . Hence, carbon leakage may offset domestic emission savings and may even lead to higher worldwide emissions. The potential competitiveness loss and carbon leakage have sparked a debate about carbonrelated border tax adjustment (BTA) measures. These BTAs have the air of green protectionism and could be costly if noncommitted countries resort to retaliation. Clearly it is important to assess the empirical relevance of carbon leakage.
A prerequisite for leakage is that committed countries indeed strengthen their climate policies. This is hard to test directly. 2 Yet in the online appendix, we provide illustrative evidence that Kyoto countries-those with binding Kyoto commitments-adopted more climate policy measures after ratification. 3 Moreover, Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) use an instrumental variables (IV) approach 4 to show that Kyoto commitment has indeed reduced territorial carbon emissions in a sample of about forty countries. 5 In contrast, Kyoto has not affected the aggregate carbon footprint of countries. While this result suggests that the dissociation of territorial emissions and footprints may be due to trade, the employed macroperspective does not allow testing for the role of trade; it also rules out disentangling the scale, technique, and composition effects stressed in the theoretical literature.
Researchers have used computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to assess ex ante the amount of carbon leakage resulting from unilateral climate policy initiatives. Leakage is typically measured as the emission increase in non-Kyoto countries relative to the emission reduction in Kyoto countries. The results of the CGE simulations differ depending on parameterization and modeling assumptions. They range from moderate leakage rates of 5% to 40% (Felder & Rutherford, 1993; Bernstein, Montgomery, & Rutherford, 1999; Burniaux & Oliveira Martins, 2012; Elliott et al., 2010) to up to 130% (Babiker, 2005) .
Carbon leakage is a special case of the pollution haven effect, on which there is a substantial econometric literature. 6 The general insight is that environmental regulation indeed affects trade flows and the location choice of firms. Evidence on carbon leakage is, however, scant. To our knowledge, the only studies investigating the effect of carbon policy on the value of bilateral trade are World Bank (2008) and Aichele and Felbermayr (2013b) . These studies ignore differences in sectoral, country-specific carbon intensities and therefore cannot address the issue of carbon leakage. Moreover, Levinson (2009) warns that a proper assessment of emission savings due to trade requires accounting for the emissions embodied in intermediates and where they are sourced. For these reasons, we use information on the input-output structure and on sectoral emission intensities for forty countries, fifteen industries, and the years 1995 to 2007 to compute the carbon content of bilateral trade flows. 7 It measures all direct and upstream CO 2 emissions associated with a trade flow along the production chain. Changes in the carbon content of trade reflect total emission changes in a trade partner and thus allow testing for leakage. 8 Our empirical approach is based on a theoretical gravity model for the carbon content of bilateral trade that features climate policy. We show analytically that a unilateral increase of a country's carbon price leads to increased carbon imports from the unregulated rest of the world. We exploit a quasi-natural experiment, the Kyoto Protocol, to test for leakage in our data. We deal with nonrandom selection into the Kyoto Protocol by exploiting the structure of our data. While the observational units in our analysis are country pair-sectors (dyads), selection into a multilateral agreement such as Kyoto is done by single countries (monads) based on that country's position relative to all trading partners. 9 The identification assumption is that conditional on the extensive use of country × year dummies, transitory bilateral import shocks on the industry-level do not correlate with ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as measured by a multilateral dummy variable.
Our estimations imply that sectoral carbon imports of a committed country from an uncommitted exporter are about 8% higher than if the country had no commitments. The carbon intensity of those imports is about 3% higher. We find robust evidence for carbon leakage in industries such as basic metals, other nonmetallic mineral products, or paper and pulp. Wood and wood products or textiles seem unaffected by leakage. Our results highlight the importance of subjecting all countries of the world to binding emission targets. They also imply that countries' domestic emissions are poor measures of their overall impact on climate change.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II sketches the gravity model for embodied CO 2 . Section III discusses our empirical strategy. Section IV describes our data, and section V presents the results and robustness checks. Section VI concludes. 7 Several studies have estimated the carbon content of trade for a cross section of countries; see Peters and Hertwich (2008) and Nakano et al. (2009) . Peters et al. (2011) have provided estimates for 113 regions for the years 1990 to 2008 based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 7. GTAP 7 only provides emission coefficients and input-output data only for its base years (1997, 2000, and 2004) . The estimates for the years in between are interpolations. In contrast to Peters et al. (2011) , we have yearly data on emission coefficients. None of the studies exploits bilateral data and employs econometric techniques.
8 Grether et al. (2012) use a similar logic to study the pollution haven effect. They show that differences in environmental stringency lead to more embodied imports of local pollutants such as sulfur dioxide.
9 See Copeland and Taylor (2005) for a theoretical argument on the optimal choice of carbon policies.
II. A Simple Theoretical Framework
This section sketches a simple theoretical framework of indirect bilateral trade in CO 2 emissions. The objective is to deliver a gravity equation for the carbon content of bilateral trade and provide guidance in the theory-consistent accounting for embodied CO 2 emissions. To meet these aims, the model allows domestic and imported intermediate inputs and for technology differences across sectors and countries. We derive the comparative statics and a decomposition of carbon policy effects into scale and technique effects. 10 Since the model is a straightforward extension of the Krugman (1980) gravity model, we are brief and relegate all details and derivations to the online appendix. 11
A. Gravity for CO 2
There are K countries, indexed i, j = 1, . . . , K, that are structurally similar but may differ with respect to climate policy or population size L i . Each country consumes a manufacturing and a homogeneous good. Preferences are Cobb-Douglas, and ω denotes the expenditure share of manufacturing. The homogeneous good is freely traded; it is assumed to be produced by every country under perfect competition, requires only labor input under a linear one-to-one technology, and acts as numeraire so that wages w i = 1. The manufacturing good is a Cobb-Douglas composite of varieties from S sectors, indexed s = 1, . . . , S. μ s denotes the expenditure share of sector s in manufacturing, with μ s = 1. Within each sector s, agents have constant elasticity of substitution preferences over varieties, with σ s > 1 the sectoral elasticity of substitution. As usual, we assume iceberg trade costs τ
, with N s j denoting the number of symmetric varieties produced in country j and p s j the respective mill price. The S differentiated goods sectors feature monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale, and free entry. The minimum unit cost function of a firm is c 
where Z ≡ μω( In the next step, we show how to derive the carbon content of trade-the quantity of CO 2 that is embodied in a country pair's trade flows. In our baseline calculations, we account only for upstream emissions of domestic suppliers. We refer to this concept as the single-region input-output (SRIO) method. 14 It allows inference on the amount of emissions (direct and upstream) relocated to a trade partner when country i strengthens its climate policy-that is, on carbon leakage. From Shephard's lemma, a sector's direct CO 2 unit requirement is given by e x = βc x /t x . All sectoral CO 2 intensities are collected in a row vector e x . In a similar vein, intermediate input requirements are collected in the exporter's domestic input-output (I-O) 
Substituting equation (1) into (2), one obtains a gravity equation for CO 2 . Climate policy affects the carbon content of trade through the sector's embodied emission intensity η x , market and supply capacities, and the intermediates multiplier.
Since the carbon content of trade is influenced by trade imbalances, a country pair's CO 2 terms of trade (CTT), at the sectoral level defined as
constitute a useful alternative measure to study relative CO 2 intensities (see Antweiler, 1996 , for a more general discussion of pollution terms of trade). CTT larger than 1 implies that i's exports are more carbon intensive than its imports from j, and vice versa. 13 The standard framework is discussed in Redding and Venables (2004) , from which we borrow the terms market and supply capacity.
14 In an empirical robustness check, we compare the SRIO to the alternative multiregion input-output (MRIO) method, which also accounts for foreign upstream emissions caused by imports of intermediates. Trefler and Zhu (2010) show that the MRIO approach differs from the SRIO approach simply by using a multiregional input-output table-a KS × KS matrix whose elements are bilateral I-O matrices (see the online appendix for details). The MRIO method is required when one is interested in a country's total carbon footprint. Its major drawback is that effects in the trade partner cannot easily be disentangled from effects in third countries.
B. Climate Policy and the CO 2 Content of Bilateral Trade
Following Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) , we decompose the total sectoral effect of climate policy on carbon flows into two terms: a technique effect that relates to the substitution away from energy toward other factors of production and a scale effect, driven by the change in the cost of production relative to other countries and therefore to the volume of sectoral imports. 15 In principle, the importer's technique and scale effect are both affected by own carbon prices as well as by the ones of foreign countries. Neglecting third-country effects and usingx = dx/x, we can linearize
where κ ξ,j denotes the elasticity of variable ξ ∈ {η, Q} with respect to j's carbon price. For a case of no intermediates usage, α = 0, we can derive analytical solutions for comparative statics results. If the importer country m imposes a carbon price while the exporter country x does not (i = m;t m > 0,t x = 0), there is no technique effect, since in our special case, country m s climate policy does not have any price effect in country x, so κ η,m = 0. 16 The sign of the scale effect κ Q,m depends on the strength of cost increases in m and on x's proximity relative to other source countries, which in turn depends on all bilateral trade costs and multilateral resistance. While the scale effect is generally ambiguous, in the two-country case, country x increases the share of varieties it produces so that imports Q mx increase and, hence, κ Q,m > 0.
If the exporter country x imposes a carbon tax while the importer m remains inactive (i = x,t x > 0,t m = 0), country m s carbon imports are decreased by the technique effect, since country x lowers its carbon intensity with an elasticity of κ η,x = −(1 − β) < 0. The sign of the scale effect κ Q,x is again ambiguous. In a two-country world, κ Q,x < 0 as country x loses competitiveness so that the volume of its sales falls unambiguously.
Summarizing, we expect the carbon content of imports to rise if the importer strengthens its climate policy and to fall if the exporter does so. Higher elasticities of substitution σ or higher carbon intensities β lead to stronger reactions of the carbon content of trade in response to climate policy.
III. Empirical Strategy and Threats to Identification
To empirically test for carbon leakage, we exploit a specific climate policy experiment: the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The protocol assigned country-specific emission targets amounting to an average reduction of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% with respect to the base year 1990. But it left countries free to use their preferred climate policy instruments. Besides cap-and-trade systems, 17 countries enacted a vast array of additional climate policies. 18 Many passed laws to promote the use of alternative energy sources (e.g., with feed-in tariffs or subsidies to research and development), passed regulations on gasoline consumption for cars or housing isolation, required labeling for electric equipment, and so on.
Due to this plethora of different policy activities, we work with a simple indicator variable K it ∈ {0, 1}, where t indexes years. 19 It is 1 if a country has ratified the Kyoto Protocol in that or a previous year and has a binding emission cap. (Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005) , we assume that ratification in national parliament is the decisive treatment date and set a Kyoto dummy accordingly. Two alternative dates come to mind: signature and entry into force. We discard signature in 1997 since it is a pure expression of intention, and we expect anticipation effects already before entry into force in 2005. 20 
A. Regression Model
In the following, we focus on emissions embodied in industry-level imports E s mxt as the main dependent variable, but we may replace it by its components Q s mxt and η s xt or by the CTT measure in some of our regressions. We substitute equation (1) into equation (2) and log-linearize the equation. Introducing full sets of country × year dummies (ν mt , ν xt ) and a country pair-industry-specific effect ν s mx , our key regression equation is
All time-variant exporter-or importer-specific terms in equation (2) 18 In the online appendix, we provide descriptive evidence that Kyoto countries started adopting more climate-relevant policy measures after ratification.
19 This approach is standard in evaluations of other international agreements' trade effects like free trade agreements (FTA) (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Rose, 2004) where treatment heterogeneity also occurs. 20 In a robustness check, we use a long difference-in-differences (diffin-diff) estimator on pre-and posttreatment averages. By defining a broad treatment window (2001) (2002) (2003) , we find that the uncertainty about the exact timing of treatment is less severe. 21 We cover forty countries, twelve industries, and thirteen years. Hence, we use a maximum of 40 × 39 × 13 = 20, 280 industry-by-country pair effects and 40 × 13 = 520 country effects.
vector POL mxt collects trade policy controls (i.e., FTA, joint EU and WTO membership), and ε s mxt is a mean zero transitory error, which we cluster at the country pair-industry level. The key variable of interest is differential Kyoto commitment DK mxt = K mt −K xt . If the dependent variable is Q s mxt , the coefficient on DK mxt is the scale effect; the coefficient on η s xt gives the technique effect. The scale and technique effects add up to the total effect on carbon flows κ.
The average amount of industry-level-embodied emission imports between two countries (i.e., over time) is explained by ν s mx ; the effect on total emission imports (i.e., across all trade partners) or exports is explained by ν mt , ν xt . Hence, identification of κ relies on variation in DK mxt within country pair-industry cells over time. The main advantage of the setup is that it helps in the identification of a causal treatment effect. It has been used in many applications of the gravity model (e.g., for the estimation of FTA effects). 22 Consistent and unbiased estimation of the treatment effect κ requires the identifying assumption
to hold. It may fail for two reasons: (a) industry-level transitory import shocks affect the status of Kyoto commitment (reverse causation), or (b) some omitted variable drives both DK mxt and E s mxt (omitted variables bias). Both problems may arise if selection into Kyoto is not random.
B. Selection into Kyoto
The literature suggests that self-interested countries weigh costs and benefits when deciding whether to adopt emission control policies (Copeland & Taylor, 2005) . For example, a country's choice may depend on its degree of vulnerability to climate change, its environmental policy preferences, its endowment with alternative energy sources, its structure of comparative advantage, or its level of GDP per capita. In a trade context, a country may also be concerned about a loss of competitiveness with respect to trade partners.
We model selection with the help of a linear probability model. The Kyoto dummy takes value 1 if net benefits X it b + X itb + η it are nonnegative:
where η it is an i.i.d. shock and X it is a vector of observable andX it of unobserved variables that may determine Kyoto membership. Failure to control for unobserved country factors that determine both the climate policy stance and trade would introduce a nonzero conditional correlation between ε s mxt and K it . The use of country-year fixed effects in equation (4) allows controling for all components of X it andX it , thereby reducing omitted variables bias. Importantly, the selection process is multilateral in nature: a country i's commitment engages it relative to all other countries, committed or not and across all industries. Nonetheless, bilateral industry-level shocks may enter the vectors X it orX it in some aggregated form. For example, if the share of total imports from noncommitted countries matters for the decision maker, then the vectorX it would contain a weighted average of foreign variables X * it = j =i π ijt X jt . If π ijt is a trade share, then K it would correlate with the error term in equation (4), ε s mxt . However, the construction of X * it involves double aggregation: over industries and over trade partners. Hence, we do not expect transitory industry trade-pair shocks to shift K it around, except in extreme cases. Therefore, a necessary condition for assumption (5) to hold is that no industry-level pair-specific transitory shock be important enough to move K it . If this is true, then DK mxt would be uncorrelated to ε s mxt as well.
C. Cases of Identification Failure and Signs of Resulting Biases
In the following, we discuss cases under which our identification strategy equation (5) may fail. One implication of (5) is that, given controls, in the counterfactual world without Kyoto treatment, the control group and the treatment group evolve identically over time. However, even without the Kyoto Protocol, the group of countries with identical Kyoto status (for which DK mxt = 0) could be on a different trend concerning the outcome variables from the groups of countries with differential Kyoto status (for which DK mxt = 0). To the extent that we do not capture this trend difference with our country × year dummies, the error term would correlate with differential Kyoto status, thus biasing our results. For example, countries with Kyoto commitments are mostly rich Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (North, N), while the noncommitted countries are developing countries (South, S). If, for some reason unrelated to Kyoto, trade between North and South is booming, our results could be spurious and biased upward.
Note, however, that the scope for such a bias is likely to be limited. Every country pair N, S is observed twice in a year-industry combination-once with N importing from S and once with S importing from N. If N is an industrialized (Kyoto) country and S a developing (non-Kyoto) country, then DK NSt = 1 and DK SNt = −1. If trade between N and S is increasing, both E s NSt and E s SNt receive a positive shock. So in the part of the sample where N is the importer, κ would be biased upward, while in the part of the sample where N is the exporter, κ would be biased downward. A generalized trade boom would therefore not lead to a systematic bias. A similar argument applies within imports across industries: when unaccounted changes in comparative advantage patterns lead N countries to import more from S in carbon-intensive industries, then we would expect an upward bias in κ. However, the logic of comparative advantage implies that imports in noncarbon-intensive industries should fall; this would generate a negative bias.
Assumption (5) would also be violated if a transitory shock on industry-level bilateral imports correlates with countries' strategic and persistent choices on whether and how to address climate change. For a first case of reverse causation, suppose a reciprocal transitory shock on sectoral bilateral trade between m and x, ε s mxt = ε s xmt > 0 that is large enough to matter on the country level. Does such a shock make DK mxt = 1 more likely? Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2012) argue that closer trade ties foster policy coordination. In our case, this would make K mt = K xt more likely. Such a situation would lead to a downward bias in the estimated κ and stack the cards against finding carbon leakage.
Finally, suppose an importer m is set to choose K mt = 1. Now suppose a nonreciprocal positive industry-level shock on imports from an important partner ε s mxt > 0. Assume that the shock induces m to deviate to K mt = 0. Then if the exporter x had chosen K xt = 1, the shock would have led to a shift of DK mxt from 0 to −1. In such a setting, the import shock would have biased κ toward 0. If, without the shock, the importer would have chosen K mt = 0 anyway, the shock does not have any effect. If the exporter had chosen K xt = 0, again, one would obtain a bias on κ with a negative sign. Only in the implausible case where a positive import shock would trigger commitment of country m would the bias be positive. To minimize the risk of reporting spurious results, we run a number of placebo tests and also apply IV techniques.
IV. Data and Descriptives
To compute the carbon content of bilateral trade flows in equation (2), we require I-O tables B x , emission coefficients e x , and trade flows Q mx to account for upstream CO 2 emissions. The OECD provides harmonized I-O tables for forty countries. A key feature of these data is the presence of a time dimension for the major share of countries. 23 The OECD I-O tables contain 48 industries (two-digit International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, ISIC). Unfortunately, we have to aggregate the I-O data to 15 industries to match the available emissions data. 24 To compute sectoral CO 2 emission coefficients, we use information on the level of sectoral CO 2 emissions from fuel combustion reported by IEA. 25 In order to obtain emission coefficients, we need to divide sectoral emission levels by some measure of sectoral output. Whenever possible, output data come from the OECD's STAN database. When data are missing, we use the Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT4) of the UNIDO and the U.N. System of National Accounts. Bilateral trade data are obtained from the UN COMTRADE database. 26 We use a concordance table from Eurostat to translate the data from the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) commodity classification into ISIC. The sample covers around 70% of world trade flows and 80% of worldwide CO 2 emissions in a given year. A detailed data description and a country list are relegated to the appendix.
Next, we provide a brief descriptive analysis of scale, technique, and overall effect of differential Kyoto commitment DK ijt . This gives three groups of country pairs: the control group, where both trade partners have the same Kyoto status (DK ijt = 0), and two groups with treated pairs where either only the importer or only the exporter is a Kyoto country (DK ijt = 1 and −1, respectively). Looking at average sectoral bilateral data, figure 1 divides the sample into a pretreatment (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and a posttreatment period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . With one exception, Kyoto countries ratified the protocol between 2001 and 2003, and we choose the pre-and posttreatment periods to be symmetric around this treatment window. 27 The 25 Other sources of CO 2 emissions such as fugitive emissions, industrial processes, or waste are disregarded. However, CO 2 emissions from fuel combustion make up 80% of total CO 2 emissions. We also do not consider emissions from international transportation. See Cristea et al. (2013) for a detailed analysis. 26 We do not have information on bilateral service trade. 27 Russia, which ratified in 2004, is treated as Kyoto country. Since Australia ratified in late 2007, it is treated as non-Kyoto country.
black bars in figure 1 show the average difference between pre-and posttreatment values of the outcome variables, in logs, for country pairs in each of the three groups.
The left panel in figure 1 shows bilateral import growth. While trade has increased significantly in all groups, imports of non-Kyoto countries from Kyoto trade partners have risen the least (50%). For pairs with a Kyoto importer only, imports have increased most (71%). The black line shows the linear fit of a long difference-in-difference regression of ln Q mxt on DK mxt . The resulting coefficient is 0.11. So Kyoto importers have a higher increase in import volumes from noncommitted countries. The middle panel shows that the carbon intensity of bilateral imports has dropped dramatically, reflecting fuel-saving technological progress or a shift toward greener varieties, or both. Country pairs with DK ijt = 1 (importer but not exporter committed) have seen the smallest decrease in the carbon intensity of their imports, around 46%. The long difference-in-difference regression yields a coefficient on DK ijt of 0.06. The right panel in figure 1 looks at the carbon content of imports. It shows that for a pair with only a committed exporter, the carbon content of imports fell by about 8% on average. For country pairs in the control group, the carbon content of trade has risen by 12% and for country pairs with only a Kyoto importer by 25%. The long difference-indifference regression of ln E mxt on DK mxt gives a coefficient of 0.16. This suggests that a Kyoto country increases its carbon content of imports by more than a similar non-Kyoto country. Figure 1 is suggestive, but, as discussed in section III, it is potentially plagued by two problems. First, both the value and CO 2 content of imports are driven by confounding factors that are not taken account of in the figure. Second, Kyoto Fixed-effects (FE) panel regressions on pooled sectoral data. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering within country pair and sector; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. CTT: sectoral carbon terms of trade according to Antweiler (1996) ; computed as emission intensity of exporter over emission intensity of importer in a given sector.
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commitments may be endogenous. The next section turns to more demanding empirical specifications.
V. Results

A. Benchmark Regressions
We first estimate equation (4) on pooled sectoral data. Column 1 of table 1 uses the log of imports (in U.S. dollars), Q, as the dependent variable. The estimated scale effect of Kyoto commitment is 0.050 and statistically significant at the 1% level. It implies that differential Kyoto commitment increases imports by about 5%. This suggests that in line with carbon leakage, production relocates to non-Kyoto countries. The coefficients obtained on covariates are fairly standard in gravity estimation. 28 Our specification explains 20% of the within variation in sectoral bilateral import flows.
Turning to the technique effect, column 2 reports a strongly significant coefficient of differential Kyoto commitment of 0.028. 29 Hence, Kyoto commitment of the importer but not the exporter increases imports' CO 2 intensity by almost 3% compared to the counterfactual of same Kyoto status, a finding consistent with the leakage hypothesis. Likewise, Kyoto commitment of the exporter but not the importer reduces the sectoral CO 2 intensity of imports-a cleaning-up effect in Kyoto countries. Note that the estimated technique effect could be the result of true changes in the CO 2 intensity of production: Kyoto countries produce cleaner and nonKyoto countries dirtier. But since our sectors are very broad categories (two-digit ISIC), the reported effect could partly 28 Free trade agreements increase bilateral imports by about 10%. Inference on joint WTO membership is difficult as only Estonia (in 1999) and China (in 2001) change their WTO status in the observed time period. Joint EU membership has the expected positive sign. 29 Our regressions use the same country dummies regardless of whether a country appears as an importer or an exporter. Using separate dummies, we would not be able to identify the effect of differential Kyoto commitment on η s x but could still infer the effect from the decomposition in equation (3). also be due to a within-sector composition effect. While our data do not allow disentangling these two possibilities, either effect is consistent with leakage. The positive sign on the technique effect in column 2 is supported by a negative Kyoto estimate in the carbon terms of trade specification in column 3. 30 Differential Kyoto commitment leads to a decline in the CTT of about 4%, so Kyoto countries' exports become less CO 2 intensive in comparison to their imports.
Finally, differential Kyoto commitment increases bilateral CO 2 imports by roughly 8% (see column 4). This is again consistent with carbon leakage. The positive Kyoto effect implies that compared to the counterfactual, additional emissions occur in non-Kyoto countries and are then virtually imported by Kyoto countries. Scale and technique effect add up to the effect on CO 2 imports. It implies that about twothirds of the total effect are attributable to changes in the scale of trade. The remaining third is explained by the technique effect.
B. Sources of Endogeneity Bias
Next, table 2 presents results from less demanding specifications to better understand the sources of endogeneity bias. The upper panel shows results on trade flows, the lower panel on carbon trade flows. Table 2 focuses on Kyoto coefficients. 31 Column 1 in each panel replicates the benchmark model for easier comparison.
Panel A focuses on import flows Q mx . The model presented in column 2 is based on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation in the cross-section 2006. 32 The estimated Kyoto coefficient is 0.13 and statistically significant at the 1% level. 30 Note that the number of observations drops slightly because the CTT measure is not defined if either exports or imports in a country pair are 0.
31 Full regression output is relegated to tables E-I and E-II in the appendix. 32 As is standard in cross-sectional gravity, the importer's and exporter's GDP in logs control for market size and the log of bilateral distance and dummies for contiguity, common language and joint FTA, WTO, and EU membership proxy for bilateral trade costs. Linear approximations of . In FE estimation, standard errors are corrected for clustering within country pair and sector. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Regressions without country-pair FE include dummies for contiguity, common language, and common border. Regressions without county-and-year effects include GDPs and all relevant multilateral resistance (MR) control variables (FTA, WTO, EU, distance, contiguity, common language). See Baier and Bergstrand (2009). This implies a Kyoto effect of about 13.9%-2.7 times larger than the benchmark estimate of 5.1%. Column 3 presents results from pooling all sample years and estimating the same specification as in column 2, albeit with year dummies to capture cyclical events like business cycles or oil price shocks. The Kyoto estimate is 0.071, again highly statistically significant. The obtained estimate is about one and a half times larger than in the benchmark. Exploiting the panel dimension and using country pair-sector fixed-effects estimation brings down the point estimate to 0.060 in column 4. It is still about 20% larger than the benchmark estimate. In line with the self-selection argument brought forward in section IIIB, the inclusion of country × time effects as in the benchmark (column 1) brings the Kyoto point estimate down from 0.060 to 0.050. Although the bias is reduced further relative to the specification of column 4, it seems minor. 33 Hence, time-invariant country pair-sector unobserved heterogeneity, which nests country-specific unobserved heterogeneity, constitutes a large part of omitted variable bias. In column 5, we investigate the issue of reverse causality. Using the panel approach of column 4, we apply the IV strategy of Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) and instrument Kyoto ratification with ratification of the Statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 34 We find an estimate of the Kyoto effect of about 7%, statistically significant at the 5% level. We conclude that reverse causality is unlikely to drive our results.
We repeat the same exercise for the carbon content of imports in panel B. The pattern is similar as in panel A. multilateral resistance terms from Baier and Bergstrand (2009) are also included. 33 The country-and-year effects in equation (1), however, are jointly strongly significant (the F-statistic is 35.83).
34 The instrument appears strong, and the first stage shows a strong, positive correlation between the differential ICC and Kyoto status (the first-stage F-statistic is well above the critical threshold; see table E-III in the online appendix).
Controlling for country pair-sector unobserved heterogeneity brings down the Kyoto estimate from 0.21 to 0.099. The inclusion of country × time effects further reduces the point estimate from 0.099 to 0.078 in the benchmark. While we overestimate Kyoto's effect by almost 200% in column 2, the bias is 28% in column 4. 35 
C. Placebo Tests
Our identifying assumption requires that in a counterfactual world without Kyoto ratification, trends in imports and CO 2 imports are the same in the treatment and control group. One important objection is that Kyoto ratifiers are mostly developed countries, while non-Kyoto countries are mostly developing countries. Our results could reflect a general trend of changing comparative advantage: developing countries moving into the production of carbon-intensive goods while catching up in terms of their trade flows. We run two placebo tests to deal with this concern.
First, we check for diverging trends in outcomes before the Kyoto ratification process started, that is, in the years 1995 to 2000. We impose a fictitious treatment on Kyoto countries in either 1997 or 1998, dates right in the middle of the pretreatment period. Columns 1 to 3 in table 3 present the results. 36 Columns 1 and 2 use yearly data, and column 3 runs a regression on fictitious pre-and posttreatment averages. We find no evidence for a positive and significant correlation of the outcome variables with placebo treatment. In 1998, we even 35 This bias is larger than the corresponding one for trade flows. This seems plausible. From theory we know that the carbon content depends on countries' unit costs. Omission of countries' sectoral production technology leads to an upward bias when technological improvements are positively correlated to Kyoto. 36 The estimation strategy and set of covariates is as in the benchmark. But the EU dummy is dropped because no country accessed the EU in the period 1995 to 2000, and hence there is no time variation to exploit. The full regression output is relegated to tables E-IV to E-VII in the appendix. Country pair-sector fixed-effects regressions on pooled sectoral data. All regressions with FTA, joint EU, and WTO membership dummies (not shown). Columns 1 to 3 restrict the sample to the pretreatment years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and impose a fictious treatment on Kyoto countries. Column 3 uses long difference-in-difference estimation on pre-and posttreatment averages. Columns 4 and 5 restrict the control group to developed non-Kyoto countries: (a) the United States and (b) Australia, Israel, Korea, and the United States, respectively. In column 6, the United States is added to the set of Kyoto ratifiers (fictitious ratification date 2002). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses). Standard errors are corrected for clustering within country pair and sector; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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find a negative and significant relationship for the Kyoto variable. 37 There is no evidence supporting different pretreatment trends in imports, CO 2 intensity, or CO 2 imports.
The second placebo test is based on the idea of comparing Kyoto countries with other developed non-Kyoto countries only. 38 Column 4 in table 3 includes only the United States in the control group and column 5 all developed non-Kyoto countries. 39 The estimated coefficients are broadly in line with the benchmark. Alternatively, we include the United States in the set of Kyoto countries (with a hypothetical ratification in 2002; see column 6). If the alternative interpretation of developed versus developing countries were true, this change in the set of Kyoto ratifiers should strengthen the Kyoto effect and increase the point estimates. However, they are slightly reduced. Comparing Kyoto countries with other developed non-Kyoto ratifiers shows that our Kyoto effects are not common to all high-income countries. 37 This would suggest Kyoto countries had a trend of declining imports and virtual CO 2 imports in the pretreatment period. 38 We drop observations if both trade partners are non-Kyoto countries unless one of them is a developed country. To make interpretation easier, we also drop all observations where both trade partners are Kyoto countries, which does not change results. This strategy implies that we compare a Kyoto country's imports from non-Kyoto countries with, for example, the U.S. imports from non-Kyoto countries and, similarly, a Kyoto country's exports to non-Kyoto countries with, for example, the U.S. exports to nonKyoto countries.
D. Further Robustness Checks
39 These are Israel, South Korea, the United States, and Australia. Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol only in 2007, so it is coded as a non-Kyoto country for the entire time period. 40 To save space, the table reports only effects on imports, carbon terms of trade, and carbon content of imports (the effect on carbon intensity is the difference between the coefficient on total CO 2 imports and the one is measured. Columns A1 to A3 use the MRIO measure instead of the SRIO measure to calculate carbon content. Compared to table 1, results are almost identical. They do not appear sensitive to whether upstream emissions in third countries are taken into account. Column A4 fixes input-output tables and emission coefficients at the year 2000. Thereby, energy-saving technical progress remains unaccounted for. Compared with the benchmark results, differential commitment increases CO 2 imports by 5%; this is only about two-thirds of the effect obtained when technical change is allowed for. Alternatively, if only the input-output table is fixed in the year 2000, this does not affect the estimated coefficient; see column A5. Changes in the economies' supply structure play no role for Kyoto's effect on embodied carbon.
Panel B uses alternative samples. Columns B1 to B3 exclude China and the transition countries to check whether results are driven by the dramatic increase in Chinese trade after its WTO accession in 2001 or by industrial restructuring following communism in Eastern Europe. 41 The overall picture remains intact: the scale effect is again about 5%. Differential Kyoto commitment leads to an increase in the volume of carbon imports by about 3% (column B3). In this sample, however, differential commitment lowers the carbon intensity of imports by about 2%. This finding is supported by a positive effect on the CTT. 42 Columns B4 to B6 aggregate trade flows over sectors. Compared to the benchmark, on imports) and suppresses all coefficients other than those on the Kyoto variable. Details are found in tables E-VIII to E-X of the online appendix. 41 Excluding only China or only the transition countries does not lead to different results. 42 The fact that the CO 2 intensity falls may be a sign that China and transition countries have increased their export sales in labor-intensive and thus relatively carbon-free sectors. sign patterns are unchanged and the scale effect is again roughly 5%. However, estimated coefficients on the carbon terms of trade and carbon imports are larger. This may be due to the presence of aggregation bias: the larger aggregate effects might be evidence for a between-sector composition effect. 43 Panel C varies the estimation strategy. Since the Kyoto dummy switches at most once within each country pair, the treatment variable and the dependent variable may have a common trend. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) 44 The obtained estimates can be interpreted as long-run effects of Kyoto commitment. Columns C1 to C3 show results for the long difference-in-difference estimator, which confirm our benchmark results.
A final concern relates to the fact that about 5% of potential trade flows in our sample are zeros. To check whether this leads to sample selection bias, we use Poisson pseudomaximum likelihood (PPML) estimation, as proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . The inclusion of many dummies into the PPML routine is known to lead to convergence problems, so we use a country pair-sector fixed-effects specification with logs of GDPs and multilateral resistance terms instead (compare column 4 of table 2). In column C5, the point estimate of the Kyoto commitment variable in the virtual CO 2 import equation is identical to the benchmark, although only statistically significant at the 10% level. The Kyoto coefficient in the import equation is no longer statistically different from 0. However, note that the PPML results and the log likelihood with and without 0s are virtually identical (see columns C4 and C5). This difference seems attributable to the nonlinear estimation procedure.
E. Industry-Level Results
Carbon intensities of imports differ significantly across sectors: they are particularly high in the mining and electricity, metals, or other minerals sectors; they are particularly low in agriculture and food products (see table A-V in the online appendix). For this reason, it is interesting to run regression (4) sector by sector. Sectors are listed in descending order of the coefficient on CO2 imports. Each cell is the result of a separate regression. The explanatory variable listed is differential Kyoto commitment and takes values (−1,0,1). The method of estimation is either fixed effects (within, FE) or long difference-in-difference estimation on pre-and posttreatment averages (long FE). Each regression includes trade policy controls (joint WTO, FTA, and EU membership) and a full set of Country × Year effects. Heteroskedacity-robust standard errors (in brackets) are adjusted for within-country pair clustering. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and the 10% levels, respectively. are sorted in descending order of Kyoto's effect on virtual CO 2 flows. Differential commitment has strong effects on total carbon imports in eight out of twelve sectors. The measured coefficientκ ranges between 8% and 20%. It is highest in carbon-intensive industries (such as basic metals or paper and pulp) or industries in which the degree of product differentiation is low (machinery, transport equipment).
The reasons for increased carbon imports vary across sectors. Leakage in the basic metals, nonmetallic mineral products, transport equipment, and machinery sector is solely due to Kyoto countries' significant increases in imports. From our theory, we would expect larger-scale effects for sectors with a high σ (i.e., a high elasticity of substitution) and, hence, rather homogeneous goods, and sectors with a high β-CO 2 intensity or sectors for which transport costs are not that important. This pattern does indeed emerge. We find the largest-scale effect for base metals and paper (high σ and high β), transport equipment and machinery (low ad valorem trade costs), and nonmetallic mineral products (high β). Less carbon-intensive products, like food products and agriculture, have no scale effect. 46 On the contrary, in the agricultural, electricity, chemicals, food products, wood, textiles and leather, and nonspecified industries sector, the carbon intensity of committed countries' imports rises and thus gives rise to more carbon imports.
Interestingly, only one sector, paper and pulp, features a positive and significant scale and technique effect. For all other sectors, we observe that the adjustment is along either the quantity traded or the emission intensity. This could be due to the structure of comparative advantage between Kyoto and non-Kyoto countries. Alternatively, it could be due to sectoral differences in the dispersion of technology across countries.
VI. Conclusion
We have developed a gravity model for carbon emissions embodied in trade flows. Stricter domestic climate policies reduce domestic emissions but may raise them elsewhere as consumers switch suppliers. This phenomenon of carbon leakage is equivalent to more emissions embodied in imports and less emissions embodied in exports. Therefore, we suggest testing for carbon leakage with a gravity-type equation for CO 2 embodied in trade. We construct a novel data set of bilateral sectoral carbon flows embodied in trade flows and investigate the role of commitment to the Kyoto Protocol. The key econometric challenge is nonrandom selection of countries into the protocol. The structure of our data allows us to use country-and-time effects to control for self-selection into treatment.
We show that carbon leakage is empirically relevant. Our estimations imply that sectoral carbon imports of a committed country from an uncommitted exporter are about 8% higher than if the country had no commitments. The carbon intensity of those imports is about 3% higher. Moreover, the analysis shows that some sectors are more prone to carbon leakage than others.
Our results suggest that the issue of carbon leakage poses a serious challenge to partial international climate-saving programs. The best policy to combat climate change, a worldwide cap on emissions, seems politically infeasible at the moment. So our results give credence to Mattoo and Subramanian (2013) who propose moderate BTAs for rich countries toward developing countries. Since such taxes pose important informational problems and may be conceived as protectionist, more research into their design is needed.
While our finding of increased carbon imports of committed importers from non-Kyoto countries is a necessary condition for the existence of carbon leakage, we cannot easily compare our estimates with the carbon leakage measures obtained in CGE studies. To this end, we would need an estimate of the average Kyoto country's emission savings due to its climate policy. Such a number is proposed by Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) who find emission savings of about 7%. Based on data for 2007, combining this estimate with the results from this paper, we would obtain a leakage rate of approximately 40%. With the aim of further substantiating this estimate, future work should try to move to a structural estimation of the gravity model in order to simulate a counterfactual world without the Kyoto agreement. This would also allow identifying country-level heterogeneities and assessing border tax adjustment proposals.
